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Abstract [Context] In many domains such as healthcare and banking, IT systems
need to fulfill various requirements related to security. The elaboration of security
requirements for a given system is in part guided by the controls envisaged by the
applicable security standards and best practices. An important difficulty that analysts
have to contend with during security requirements elaboration is sifting through a
large number of security controls and determining which ones have a bearing on the
security requirements for a given system. This challenge is often exacerbated by the
scarce security expertise available in most organizations. [Objective] In this article,
we develop automated decision support for the identification of security controls that
are relevant to a specific system in a particular context. [Method and Results] Our
approach, which is based on machine learning, leverages historical data from security
assessments performed over past systems in order to recommend security controls for
a new system. We operationalize and empirically evaluate our approach using real
historical data from the banking domain. Our results show that, when one excludes
security controls that are rare in the historical data, our approach has an average recall
of ≈ 94% and average precision of ≈ 63%. We further examine through a survey
the perceptions of security analysts about the usefulness of the classification models
derived from historical data. [Conclusions] The high recall – indicating only a few
relevant security controls are missed – combined with the reasonable level of precision
– indicating that the effort required to confirm recommendations is not excessive –
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suggests that our approach is a useful aid to analysts for more efficiently identifying
the relevant security controls, and also for decreasing the likelihood that important
controls would be overlooked. Further, our survey results suggest that the generated
classification models help provide a documented and explicit rationale for choosing
the applicable security controls.
Keywords Security Requirements Engineering, Security Assessment, Automated
Decision Support, Machine Learning
1 Introduction
Many IT systems, e.g., those used in the healthcare and finance sectors, need to meet a
variety of security requirements in order to protect against attacks. The elaboration of
these requirements is heavily influenced by the security controls prescribed by standards
and best practices such as the ISO 27000 family of standards (ISO and IEC 2018),
NIST SP 800 guidelines (NIST 2012), and OSA security patterns (OSA 2018). These
controls define a wide range of technical and administrative measures for the avoidance,
detection and mitigation of security risks (Furnell 2008). An example security control
from ISO 27002 is: “The integrity of information being made available on a publicly
available system should be protected to prevent unauthorized modification.” If an
application has information assets with public access points, this control may be
elaborated into detailed security requirements aiming to avoid information tampering.
For a specific IT system in a particular context, only a subset of the controls in
the security standards and best practices have a bearing on the security requirements.
An important task that analysts need to do is therefore to decide which controls are
relevant and need to be considered during requirements elaboration. Since the controls
are numerous, performing this task entirely manually is not only cumbersome but also
error-prone, noting that deciding whether a certain control is relevant often correlates
with several contextual factors, e.g., the assets that are associated with a given system,
the threats that the system is exposed to, and the vulnerabilities that the system leads
to. Overlooking any of these factors can lead to wrong decisions about the security
controls, and potentially serious consequences. This problem is made even more acute
by the scarcity of security risk analysts available in most organizations.
Our work in this article is motivated by the need to provide automated decision
support for identifying the security controls that are pertinent to a specific system. To
this end, we observe that, in security-critical sectors, e.g., finance, security assessment
is an increasingly systematic activity, where security assessment data is collected
and recorded in a structured way (Dowd et al. 2006). Many system providers and
security consulting firms now have detailed data models in place to keep track of the
security-related properties of the systems that they analyze and the decisions they make
regarding security. This raises the prospect that existing (historical) data about security
assessments can be put to productive use for decision support. What we do in this
article is to examine the feasibility and effectiveness of this prospect in a real setting.
The starting point for our work was a year-long field study at a major international
bank. Our study aimed to develop insights into industry practices for assessing IT
security risks. The study focused specifically on early-stage security assessments
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during the system inception and requirements elaboration phases. This study led to a
precise characterization of the historical data that we had at our disposal for building
automated decision support. While the data model resulting from our field study
inevitably has bespoke concepts that are specific to our study context, the majority
of the concepts are general and aligned with widely used standards, particularly ISO
27001 and 27002. This helps provide confidence that our data model is representative
of a wider set of security practices than our immediate study context.
With a data model for security assessments at hand, we explore the use of several
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for identifying the security controls that are most
relevant to a given system and context. To this end, we define a set of features for
learning from historical security assessment data. We empirically evaluate the accuracy
of our approach using real data. Our results show that, when one excludes security
controls that are rare, i.e., apply to too few systems in the historical data, our approach
on average has a recall of ≈ 94% and precision of ≈ 63%. Since recall is high and the
number of false positives is not excessive, as suggested by precision, we conclude that
ML is a promising avenue for increasing the efficiency of identifying relevant security
controls, and also reducing the likelihood that important controls would be missed. In
situations where one has to deal with rarely used security controls, ML alone is not
sufficient; this necessitates future investigations into how ML can be complemented
with other techniques, e.g., guided manual reviews, expert rules and case-based
reasoning, in order to provide comprehensive coverage of the security controls.
To gain insight into how useful our approach is in practice, we conduct a survey
involving six security experts from our collaborating bank. The results of this survey
suggest that the explicit classification models we derive from historical data are
largely consistent with the implicit and, at the moment, undocumented reasoning
performed by the experts. In this sense, the derived classification models not only help
harmonize the decision making process about security controls but also provide a
useful aid for training new staff who are yet to be familiarized with the bank’s security
assessment process.
This article is an extension of a previous conference paper (Bettaieb et al. 2019)
published at the 25th International Working Conference on Requirements Engineering:
Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ 2019). The article offers important extensions
over the previous conference paper by: (1) providing a more thorough discussion of
background, related work, and our field study on security assessment, (2) improving
the empirical evaluation of our approach by considering additional historical data and
additional alternatives for configuring the learning process, and (3) examining the
opinions of industry experts about the practical usefulness of our approach.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background and
compares with related work. Section 3 summarizes the outcomes of our field study on
security assessment. Section 4 presents our ML-based approach for recommending
relevant security controls. Sections 5 and 6 report on our evaluation, including our
expert survey. Section 7 discusses threats to validity. Section 8 concludes the article.
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2 Background and Related Work
This section presents background on industry standards related to security controls and
machine learning algorithms used in this article. We further discuss and compare with
different strands of related research in the area of security requirements engineering,
security-control identification, and applications of machine learning.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Information Security Standards
Information security standards, e.g., ISO 27000 (ISO and IEC 2018), ISO 31000 (ISO
2018), andNISTSP800-30 (NIST2012), provide a set of guidelines and best practices to
help organizations build reliable, systematic processes for ensuring the secure handling
of sensitive data. To mitigate the risks posed by the inevitable presence of security
breaches, organizations typically tailor information security standards through specific
frameworks and methodologies, e.g., Method for an Optimised aNAlysis of Risks
(MONARC) (CASES 2018), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Caralli et al. 2007), MEthod for Harmonized Analysis of RIsk
(MEHARI) (CLUSIF 2018), VECTOR matrix (Cyber Threat Institute 2019), and
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) (ISACA 2018).
These frameworks and methodologies are primarily meant at helping organizations
identify and address security risks in a precise but manual manner. Automated decision
support for managing security risks remains an under-explored topic.
Our collaborating partner has its IT security practices grounded in the ISO
27000 family of information security standards (ISO and IEC 2018). This commonly
used series of standards provides a systematic approach for handling information
security. Among these standards, ISO 27001 and 27002 relate most closely to our
work in this article. ISO 27001 specifies a set of requirements for developing and
maintaining an Information SecurityManagement System (ISMS). The standard further
envisages requirements for the assessment and control of the security risks posed by
security breaches in IT applications. ISO 27002 complements ISO 27001 by providing
guidelines for selecting, implementing, and managing controls for security risks. The
standard has a total of 128 security controls. These controls span 11 security categories,
e.g., security policy, asset management, and access control. When performing a
security risk assessment, one has to identify the security controls that are relevant
to the enforcement of the ISMS requirements. As noted earlier, performing this task
without automated assistance is both tedious and prone to errors. Our work in this
article takes aim at providing suitable automated support for the above task.
2.1.2 Machine Learning for Decision Support
ML-based techniques have been widely used in software engineering for developing
decision support systems (Casamayor et al. 2010; Kurtanović and Maalej 2017;
Rodeghero et al. 2017). In our context, we use ML-based techniques to recommend
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ISO-specified security controls that are relevant to a given new IT project. To do so,
we rely on supervised learning; the labeled data here is the historical data from past
risk assessments. An IT application is typically associated with multiple assets, e.g.,
networks, which pose different potential risks, e.g., untrusted networks. Our decision
support, therefore, needs to consider the possibility of multiple security controls being
recommended for a given application. Ascribing security controls to a given application
should thus be viewed as a multilabel classification problem (Zhang and Zhou 2014).
Multilabel classification is performed by either (1) problem transformation, which
is to convert multilabel datasets into binary or multiclass datasets aiming to fit
the input dataset to standard binary or multiclass ML algorithms, or (2) algorithm
adaptation, which is to modify binary or multiclass ML algorithms to directly support
multilabel datasets (Zhang and Zhou 2014). In our work, we employ the former, i.e.,
problem transformation, since this technique has been successfully used in numerous
applications (Boutell et al. 2004; Park and Fürnkranz 2007; Read et al. 2009; Tsoumakas
and Vlahavas 2007) and is further independent from individual binary and multiclass
ML algorithms thus allowing us to compare several ML algorithms.
Problem transformation techniques can be categorized into binary relevance
(Boutell et al. 2004), classifier chain (Read et al. 2009), calibrated label ranking (Park
and Fürnkranz 2007), and random k-labelsets (Tsoumakas and Vlahavas 2007).
In our work, individual security controls are selected based on contextual factors
and independently of other security controls. We thus elect to base our decision
support system on the binary relevance method which decomposes a multilabel
classification problem into a set of independent binary classification problems, with
each binary classification problem corresponding to one specific label, in our context,
one security control.
An important issue we have to take account of in our approach is imbalance in our
security assessment data. In particular, we observe that the absence of security controls
is much more prevalent than their presence across the projects. This imbalance is
caused by the relatively infrequent use of several security controls. When a class – in
our context, a particular security control being applicable – is rare, ML classification
models have a tendency to predict the more prevalent classes (Batista et al. 2004).
In our context, this means that, unless steps are taken to counter imbalance for
rarely used security controls, any classification model that we build may invariably
find the rare security controls inapplicable. To tackle imbalance, we examine three
commonly used methods. These are: (1) Synthetic Minority Over-sampling TEchnique
(SMOTE) (Chawla et al. 2002), (2) SMOTE combined with Wilson’s Edited Nearest
Neighbor (ENN) (Wilson 1972), and (3) Cost-Sensitive Learning (CSL) (Elkan 2001).
SMOTE (Chawla et al. 2002) modifies a class distribution directly through
oversampling. The main idea behind SMOTE is synthesizing new artificial minority
samples by interpolating between existing minority samples. Compared to a baseline
oversampling technique which creates samples by replication, SMOTE provides better
performance in dealing with the imbalance problem since SMOTE causes a classifier
to build larger decision regions containing nearby minority samples than regions
determined by using the replication method (Chawla et al. 2002).
ENN (Wilson 1972) is an undersampling technique which creates a subset of the
original dataset by eliminating samples. ENN removes any sample whose label is
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inconsistent with the labels of at least two of its three nearest neighbors. ENN is often
used in combination with an oversampling technique such as SMOTE to mitigate
overfitting (Batista et al. 2004). This avoids synthetic minority samples from too
deeply invading the majority class regions. We apply ENN to an over-sampled dataset
produced by SMOTE as a data cleaning method.
CSL (Elkan 2001) accounts for the cost of misclassification during the construction
of a decision model. When using CSL to deal with imbalance, the cost of misclassifying
a minority sample needs to be higher than the cost of misclassifying a majority sample.
This is because minority (positive) samples are usually more important to correctly
identify than majority samples when a dataset is imbalanced. CSL is employed for
dealing with scarce use of controls leading to imbalance in our dataset.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Security Requirements Engineering
Security requirements have been widely studied for IT applications, e.g., (Dalpiaz
et al. 2016; Haley et al. 2008; Ionita and Wieringa 2016; Jufri et al. 2017; Li 2017;
Meier et al. 2003; Myagmar et al. 2005; Schmitt and Liggesmeyer 2015; Sihwi et al.
2016; Sindre and Opdahl 2005; Türpe 2017; Yu et al. 2015). The most closely related
research threads to our work are those concerned with early-stage security risk analysis.
Two notable techniques to this end are STRIDE and DREAD, both originating from
Microsoft (Meier et al. 2003). These techniques have been used and improved by many
corporations over the years (Myagmar et al. 2005). STRIDE is a method for classifying
security threats, whereas DREAD is a method to rate, compare and prioritize the
severity of the risks presented by each of the threats classified using STRIDE. Our work
is complementary to STRIDE and DREAD, first in that we focus on risk mitigation as
opposed to risk classification and triage, and second in that we take an automation
angle rather than dealing exclusively with manual security analysis.
Some prior research attempts to assist security engineers through capturing domain
expertise in a reusable form. For example, Schmitt and Liggesmeyer (2015) propose
a model for structuring security knowledge as a way to improve the efficiency of
specifying and analyzing security requirements. Sindre and Opdahl (2005) develop a
systematic approach for security requirements elicitation based on use cases, with a
focus on reusable methodological guidelines. Haley et al. (2008) present a framework
for eliciting and analyzing security requirements. The framework is based on building
a system context and representing security requirements as constraints. A problem-
oriented notation is used to specify a system context, which is then validated by
ensuring that the security constraints remain satisfied. Yu et al. (2015) explore the
automated analysis of security requirements by using a uniform representation of
risks and arguments. Through automated checking of formal arguments, they identify
relevant risks and mitigations from publicly available security catalogs. In contrast to
the above work, we explore how historical data from past security assessments can be
productively mined and reused within an industrial context for building automated
decision support while complying with the applicable information security standards.
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We further demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through empirical means by
applying the approach to an industrial case study.
2.2.2 Security-Control Identification
Decision support for selecting security controls has been previously studied in the
field of operations research. Almeida and Respício (2018) propose a framework
that helps organizations optimize a set of relevant security controls to mitigate the
security vulnerabilities identified. Their optimization aims to achieve the following two
objectives: minimizing the cost of implementing security controls and ensuring that all
the identified vulnerabilities are mitigated by at least one control. The framework casts
this optimization problem into integer programming, focusing on security controls
defined in the ISO 27002 standard.
Yevseyeva et al. (2015) develop an uncertainty-aware approach which selects
an optimal subset of security controls using an integer programming. The main
objective of their approach is diversifying security controls in order to mitigate a-priori
unknown risks.More recently, Yevseyeva et al. (2016) cast the security-control selection
problem as a two-stage decision-making process: defining a security budget, and then
distributing the defined budget across security controls. The two-stage decision-making
model is solved by using a quadratic programming technique while balancing risk and
return when distributing the budget.
Kiesling et al. (2016) propose a model-driven security-control identification
approach which combines models of security knowledge, IT applications and threats,
a discrete-event simulation of attacks, and a multi-objective genetic algorithm that
aims to identify equally viable subsets of security controls. This approach attempts
to minimize six objectives: the implementation cost of security controls, the number
of undetected attacks, the number of attacks achieving their goals, and the impact of
attacks on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
In contrast to our work, none of the above work strands attempt to leverage historical
data from past risk assessments. Further, we complement the existing literature by
providing an explicit data model for the control-related concepts envisaged by the ISO
27001 and ISO 27002 standards.
2.2.3 Applications of Machine Learning in Requirements Engineering
ML has generated a lot of traction in Requirements Engineering for supporting a variety
of tasks, e.g., extracting user-story information (Rodeghero et al. 2017), identifying
non-functional requirements (Casamayor et al. 2010), and requirements classifica-
tion (Kurtanović and Maalej 2017). Rodeghero et al. (2017) present an approach for
automatically detecting user-story information from recorded conversations between
customers and developers. Their approach builds on an ML-based classifier for detect-
ing user-story information. Casamayor et al. (2010) propose a semi-supervised learning
technique for identifying non-functional requirements. The learning technique relies
on categorized requirements and certain textual properties. In addition, their method
exploits feedback from users to improve performance. Kurtanović and Maalej (2017)
discuss how accurately they can automatically classify requirements using supervised
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machine learning techniques with text, metadata, sentiment, and syntactic features.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to attempt applying ML for generating
automated recommendations for security controls using historical data.
3 Field Study on Security Assessment
This section describes the results of a field study conducted with the goal of building
insights into how IT security assessments are done in practice.We started our study with
meetings with IT security specialists at our collaborating partner (a bank). Subsequently,
the first author spent approximately a year onsite at the partner’s headquarters, learning
about the details of the security assessment process followed there and the data model
that underlies this process.
The security assessment process at our partner is a customized procedure shaped
around the guidelines of the ISO 27000 standards (ISO and IEC 2018). A central goal
of this process is to derive, for a given system, a set of ISO-specified controls that need
to be elaborated further into security requirements.
In Figure 1(a), we show an overview of the security assessment process gleaned
from our field study, and in Figure 1(b) – a (simplified) version of the underlying
data model. While we present the security assessment process in a sequential manner,
in practice, the process is iterative. This means that before they are finalized, the
choices and the decisions made during assessment may undergo multiple rounds of
improvement based on the findings at the different steps of the process. The data model
of Figure 1(b) is populated incrementally as the assessment workflow unfolds, with
each step of the workflow adding new information.
3.1 Security Assessment Process
As shown in Figure 1(a), security assessment starts with the “create project” step. A
new project represents a proposed undertaking related to IT system development or
maintenance. The elaboration of security requirements for a given project is in part
guided by the controls envisaged by the applicable security standards and best practices.
In this step, the basic information about a project is specified, e.g., project description
and business domain. Next and in the “choose assets” step, the analysts define and
link the assets relevant to a given project. In general, an asset can be defined as a
resource with economic value that is held or controlled by an individual, corporation,
or country (ISO and IEC 2005). The step is followed by the “determine criticality” step
where the analysts, in collaboration with the business stakeholders, decide about project
criticality. The more critical a project is, the more is the need to evaluate potential
threats and vulnerabilities systematically. To evaluate the criticality of a project, the
analysts fill out a security questionnaire comprised of 12 multiple-choice questions.
Each question covers a possible aspect of exposure, e.g., the level of exposure to
external attacks. Once the questionnaire has been completed, the analysts exercise
expert judgment to decide the project criticality level and update the project information
accordingly.
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Fig. 1 Main outcomes of our field study: (a) security assessment process and (b) data model.
The “create assessment” step captures various contextual information about the
assets that have been linked to a project. The (data) type of an asset is determined by
the content that the asset stores, processes, or transfers. The classification of asset types
at our partner is based on their in-house domain expertise and the guidelines of the
national data protection authority. The confidentiality level of an asset is determined
by how sensitive its content is based on the judgment of the security experts during an
asset classification process, which is conducted separately. This attribute is a value on
an (ordinal) scale ranging from public to secret. The criticality score of an asset is a
quantitative score indicating the consequences of exposure or failure. The more serious
the consequences, the higher the criticality score is. This score determines whether the
potential risk posed by an asset is significant enough to warrant additional security
analysis. The score is derived from the following asset attributes through a combination
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of expert judgment and rules: (1) the capability attribute, capturing the output channels
to which the content of an asset can be sent, (2) the volume attribute, capturing the
volume of data that an individual transaction can read, write, or delete from an asset,
and (3) the user attribute, estimating in a logarithmic scale the number of users that
can access an asset. We note that for an individual project, our partner may conduct
multiple assessments from different perspectives and involving different groups of
analysts. In this article, when we refer to an assessment, we mean the collection of all
assessment activities performed over a given project. Consequently, the assessment
information collected per project is the union of the outcomes of all the assessment
activities performed.
Once the contextual information for the assets in a project has been specified, the
analysts move on to the identification of threats and vulnerabilities, and subsequently,
security controls. In doing so, the analysts scope their work to the threats, vulnerabilities
and controls catalogs in ISO 27001 and 27002, operating under the assumption that
these catalogs are complete. A threat refers to anything that has the potential to cause
serious harm to a system, e.g., unauthorized disclosure of confidential information (ISO
and IEC 2005). Threats are identified in the “choose threats” step of the process of
Figure 1(a). In this step, the analysts carefully examine a threat catalog consisting of 22
threat items and decide which ones are applicable. If a threat is deemed applicable to a
project, the analysts qualify the threat more precisely within the context of that project.
Specifically, for each applicable threat, the analysts provide a description, choose
an appropriate risk level, and determine whether the threat impacts confidentiality,
integrity, availability, or traceability. Next, in the “choose vulnerabilities” step, the
analysts decide about the applicable vulnerabilities. A vulnerability represents a
weakness that can be exploited by a threat, leading to the risk of asset damage or
exposure (ISO and IEC 2005). An example vulnerability would be “oversight in
defining access control rules to shared information”. At our partner, vulnerabilities are
identified using a pre-defined catalog with 154 entries. This catalog encompasses all
the vulnerabilities known to the partner in its application domain.
After identifying the vulnerabilities for the project being assessed, in the “choose
controls” step, the analysts select the appropriate security controls for the vulnerabilities.
The source for the security controls at our partner is the ISO 27002 standard (ISO
and IEC 2005). We thus refer to these controls as ISO controls. The catalog of ISO
controls used by our partner is comprised of 134 entries.
Once the applicable ISO controls are identified, the analysts propose mitigations in
the “assign mitigations” step. Essentially, a mitigation is a technical elaboration of an
ISO control. For example, given an ISO control, say, “Protect data over an untrusted
network”, the corresponding mitigation could be “Use cryptographic mechanisms
to protect data over an untrusted network”. Next, in the “determine actions” step,
actions can be specified for operationalizing the mitigations defined in the previous
step. For instance, related to the above mitigation example, the analysts can suggest
the following actions: (1) procure cryptography software, (2) provide training for
cryptography software, and (3) raise staff awareness about the risks posed by untrusted
networks. Finally, in the “validate assessment” step, the assessment is validated by
both a chief information security officer and the involved business owner.
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3.2 Data Model
Figure 1(b) shows a (simplified) version of the data model that underlies the process of
Figure 1(a). Table 1 describes each of the data attributes in the data model. As seen
from Figure 1(b), the data model is composed of three packages: “Project Data”, “Asset
Data”, and “Assessment Data”. The “Project Data” package contains the entities that
define a project to be assessed alongside its business domain/category. The “Asset Data”
package contains the “Asset” entity which captures the required assets for developing
a project. Those assets are most of the time IT-related and contained in the historical
assessment records at our collaborating partner. The “Assessment Data” package is
composed of the data entities, e.g., “Threat”, “Vulnerability”, and “Control”, that are
being updated through the risk assessment process of Figure 1(a).
The automation approach that we are going to describe in the next section focuses
on ISO control identification. In particular, we assume that the steps prior to the
“choose controls” step of the process of Figure 1(a) have been already performed for a
project, and proceed to automatically recommend relevant ISO controls for the project
in question. As such, we do not use data from the “assign mitigations”, “determine
actions” and “validate assessment” steps of the process. In the remainder of this
article, we discard the final three steps of the process of Figure 1(a) as well as the data
associated with these three steps (mitigations, actions and validations), since these
have no impact on our approach.
4 ML-based Recommendation System for Security Controls
Our approach for recommending ISO controls is based on ML. In this section, we
present the main principles and considerations behind the approach.
4.1 Source Data for Building a Classification Model
To build a classification model, we utilize the database of historical assessment records
at our collaborating partner. This database covers all the systems assessed by the
partner in the past ten years. From this database, we extract various attributes. Our
attributes, which are based on the data model of Figure 1(b), are discussed next.
4.2 Machine Learning Features
We engineered our features for learning through a joint endeavor with IT security
specialists. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, we defined the features for learning from
historical data based on the data model of Figure 1(b). Table 2 presents our feature
set alongside our intuition as to why each feature may be a useful indicator for the
relevance of ISO controls. Essentially, we chose a feature for inclusion in the set if we
deemed the feature to be characterizing an important aspect of security assessment.
For instance and as shown in Table 2, the criticality attribute of a project is used as a
feature. In contrast, the name attribute of a project is not, since the name has no impact
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Table 1 Glossary for the data model of Figure 1(b). Note that the “name” and “description” attributes of
the data entities have been excluded from the glossary since the definitions were trivial.
Data entity Attribute Description
Project Type The type of a project (total of 3 types: usual business, large scale, and
integration)
Criticality The criticality of a project (total of 3 criticality levels: very critical, critical,
and non-critical)
Business Domain The area of business under which a project falls (total of 48 domains, e.g.,
web banking and wealth management)
Category The category for a group of business domains (total of 4 categories: le-
gal/regulatory, information technology, management, and banking)




Question A security question (total of 12 questions). An example question is: “What
is the project’s level of exposure to external attacks?”
Answer An answer provided by the analysts to the question (three-point scale: low,
significant, and very high)
Asset Criticality The criticality of an asset (total of 2 criticality levels: critical and non-
critical)
Data type The data type of an asset (total of 4 types: (T1) personal, identifiable,
and secret; (T2) personal, not identifiable, and secret; (T3) personal, not
identifiable, and not secret; and (T4) others)
Confidentiality
level
The confidentiality level of an asset (total of 4 levels: public, restricted,
confidential, and secret)
Capability The capability of extracting data (total of 3 modes: screen, print, and elec-
tronic). Screen means that a user can view the data on a screen. Print means
that a user can print the data on paper. Electronic means that a user can
store the data onto an electronic device
Volume The volume of data that can be read, written, or deleted by one data transac-
tion (total of 3 types: record-by-record, percentage-per-day, and unlimited).
Record-by-record means that a user can access only one record at a time.
Percentage-per-day means that a user can access a certain percentage of the
dataset in one day. Unlimited means that a user has unlimited access
User The number of users who can access an asset
Asset
Category
Category The category for an asset (total of nine categories: application, OS, enter-
prise application suite (EAP), web application, mobile application, middle-
ware, internal tool, database, and data)
Threat Label The label of a threat
Impact The impact types of a threat (total of 4 types of impact: confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and traceability)
Risk level Estimated risk of each threat on a scale of 1-8 (negligible to extremely high)
Vulnerability Label The label of a vulnerability
Control ISOLabel An ISO control label listed in the ISO 27002 standard
Mitigation Type The platform type where the mitigation takes place, e.g., web server and
DBMS
Priority The priority of a mitigation (total of 3 priority level: high, medium, and
low)
Action Type The type of an action (total of 3 types: business, process, and infrastructure)
Owner The owner to whom an action was assigned
DueDate The due date of an action
Validation Actor The assessor who performs a validation
Comment The comment left by the assessor
ValidationDate The date of a validation
Using Machine Learning to Assist with the Selection of Security Controls 13





Features from Assessment Data: Security answer (A1..A12), Threat (T1..T22),
Threat impact (S1..S4), Risk (R1..R22), Vulnerability (V1..V154)
Features from Asset Data:
Number of assets,
Number of critical assets,
Number of assets
per category (C1..C9),












































































Fig. 2 Feature extraction from the data model in Figure 1(b).
on the identification of ISO controls. The ISO controls (not shown in the table due to
not being part of the features used for learning) are treated as class attributes for our
classification problem. We build one classifier per ISO control. The class attribute for
each ISO control is thus a binary value indicating whether or not the control is relevant
to a given project.
4.3 Choice of Classification Algorithm
We elect to use interpretable ML techniques to provide analysts not only with security
control recommendations, but also the rationale behind how the security controls were
selected. An interpretable model would explain how and why a specific decision was
made concerning a particular security control. For instance, the model would indicate
that a particular ISO control is selected mostly because a certain combination of threats
and vulnerabilities is present. Scoping our work to interpretable ML is important,
because experts are unlikely to accept decisions for which they are not provided with
an explanation.
5 Case Study
We evaluate our approach through an industrial case study from the banking domain.
The case study is a follow-on to our field study of Section 3 and was conducted with
the same industry partner.
5.1 Research Questions
Our case study aims to answer the following research questions (RQs):
RQ1 (imbalance handling and classification): What combination of imbalance
handling technique and classification algorithm is the most accurate for recommending
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Table 2 Our features for machine learning.
Feature (D) Definition and (I) Intuition
Project type (D) The type of a project (total of 3 types: usual business, large scale and integration




(D) The criticality of a project (total of 3 levels: very critical, critical, and non-critical).
(I) The more critical a project, the more stringent are the security controls.
Business
domain
(D) The area of business under which a project falls (total of 48 domains, e.g., web banking,
wealth management). (I) The feature relates to how severe the consequences of a breach
are. For example, a breach may have more severe implications in wealth management than




(D) The category for a group of business domains (total of 4 categories, e.g., le-
gal/regulatory, information technology, management, and banking). (I) The feature pro-




(D) The answers provided by the analysts to the questions on a static security questionnaire
(total of 12 questions). An example question is: “What is the project’s level of exposure
to external attacks?” All answers are on a three-point scale: low, significant, very high.
(I) The answers serve as an indicator for the seriousness of potential security breaches.
Number of
assets
(D) The number of assets linked to a project. (I) Increasing the number of assets may lead
to an increased attack surface, thus warranting more rigorous controls.
Number of
critical assets
(D) The number of critical assets in a project. (I) Critical assets are specific entities with
major importance. If these assets are compromised, the effects are more serious than those





(D) The number of assets in an asset category (total of 9 categories, e.g., mobile application
or database). (I) Each asset category has a different impact on the security controls in a
project. For example, a client database being compromised would typically have more
serious consequences than, say, a mobile application being inaccessible.
Number of
users
(D) The maximum number of users who can access the data of a project. (I) The potential
risk of data exposure is correlated to the number of users accessing the data.
Data type (D) The most sensitive type of data in an asset (total of 4 types: T1, T2, T3 and T4 as
defined in Table 1). (I) The more sensitive the data, the more impact a breach would have.
Capability (D) The capability of extracting data (total of 3 modes: screen, print, and electronic).
Screen means that a user can view the data on a screen. Print means that a user can
print the data on paper. Electronic means that a user can store the data onto an electronic
device. (I) Data exposure risks increase as one goes from screen to print to electronic
data extraction. The security controls required may thus be impacted by the extraction
capability.
Volume (D) The volume of data that can be read, written, or deleted by one data transaction (total
of 3 types: record-by-record, percentage-per-day, and unlimited). Record-by-record means
that a user can access only one record at a time. Percentage-per-day means that a user
can access a certain percentage of the dataset in one day. Unlimited means that a user has
unlimited access. (I) The risk of data exposure correlates with volume. Volume may thus
have an influence on the security controls.
Confidentiality
level
(D) The maximum confidentiality level of the assets in a project (total of 4 levels: public,
restricted, confidential, secret). (I) The higher the confidentiality level, the more severe




(D) The presence or absence of a threat (total of 22 threats). (I) Threats exploit vulnerabil-
ities. The presence of a threat has a direct influence on the security assessment decisions,
including those related to the security controls.
Threat impact
(S1..S4)
(D) Impact scores based on all the threats in a project. Separate scores are computed for
confidentiality (S1), integrity (S2), availability (S3), and traceability (S4). (I) The scores
relate to the impact of security breaches and thus may influence the controls.
Risk
(R1..R22)
(D) Estimated risk of each threat on a scale of 1-8 (negligible to extremely high). (I) The




(D) The presence or absence of a vulnerability (total of 154 vulnerabilities). (I) Security
controls counter vulnerabilities, and are naturally affected by which vulnerabilities apply.
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security controls? In RQ1, we examine imbalance handling techniques and standard
classification algorithms based on the existing best practices in the literature (Bishop
2007), and compare the accuracy of the resulting classifiers.
RQ2 (features): Which features are the most influential for recommending security
controls? Features used in constructing an ML-based classifier typically have different
degrees of importance toward the classifier’s decision making. In RQ2, we evaluate
the importance of the features in Table 2.
RQ3 (usefulness): What is the overall utility of our approach? For our approach to
be useful in practice, the decision support must propose sufficiently accurate security
controls in practical time. RQ3 measures the accuracy of our security recommendation
system at the level of projects alongside the execution time of the main steps of
our approach.
RQ4 (validation): Do security analysts find the (interpretable) classification models
generated by our approach useful?Our approach is useful only if security analysts faced
with real security risk assessment tasks can derive from the resulting (interpretable)
classification model accurate justifications to support their decisions. RQ4 aims to
assess the perceptions of security experts at our collaborating partner about the
usefulness of the generated classification models as a decision aid.
5.2 Implementation
Our recommendation system is built using the Weka framework (Hall et al. 2009).
Weka supports a broad spectrum of ML techniques. We ran our experiments on a
computer equipped with an Intel i7 CPU with 16GB of memory.
5.3 Case Study Data
Our raw data is a database of 320 assessment projects conducted over a span of ten
years, from 2009 until present. Of these assessment projects, we excluded 65 because
they either were not carried through to completion, were built for testing and training
purposes, or were using new experimental security control catalogs. This leaves us
with 255 assessment projects for evaluating our approach.
Among the controls introduced by ISO 27002, some never or too rarely appear
in our data. Based on our ML expertise and feedback from security experts, we
exclude the ISO controls that have been used less than 5 times within the selected
255 assessment projects. The applicability of such ISO controls cannot be predicted
meaningfully using ML; this implies that the risk assessors have to decide about these
controls entirely manually and without (ML-based) decision support. In summary, our
experimental dataset provides values for all the features in Table 2 and 83 ISO controls
across 255 assessment projects.












repeat for all ISO controls
Fig. 3 10-fold validation for all ISO-control classifiers.
5.4 Experimental Setup
To answer the RQs in Section 5.1, we performed three experiments, EXPI, EXPII and
EXPIII, and an expert interview survey, EIS, as described below.
EXPI. This experiment answers RQ1. We select the following interpretable ML
algorithms as candidates for building our recommendation system: Naive Bayes (John
and Langley 1995), Logistic Regression (le Cessie and van Houwelingen 1992),
J48 (Quinlan 1993), CART (Breiman et al. 1984), JRip (Cohen 1995), and PART (Frank
and Witten 1998). EXPI compares the accuracy of these six alternatives using the
features of Table 2.
We start EXPI with hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) for the six alternatives
considered. In doing so, we also account for the data imbalance problem described
in Section 2.1.2. As noted in this earlier section, we consider three techniques for
handling imbalance: SMOTE, CSL, and a combination of SMOTE and ENN, denoted
SMOTE+ENN. We recall from Section 2.1.2 that: SMOTE resolves imbalance by
adding new artificial (synthetic) minority samples to the dataset; CSL mitigates the
bias of the classifier toward the majority class by assigning a larger penalty to either
false positives or false negatives; and SMOTE+ENN oversamples the dataset then
discards the inconsistent samples. With regard to CSL, we levy a larger penalty on false
negatives, i.e., ISO controls that apply to a project but are erroneously classified as not
relevant. The proportional prevalence of the majority versus the minority (rare) class in
our experimental dataset rounds up to 14 to 1. We use this ratio for our experimentation
with CSL, i.e., we set the cost ratio of false negatives versus false positives to 14 to 1.
For HPO, we use a step-wise grid search algorithm (Mitchell 1999) that starts with
a first coarse grid search and then refines the areas of good accuracy with additional
finer-grained grid searches. For example, to find an optimal value of a real-type
hyper-parameter, at the first search iteration, i = 1, we vary the parameter value within
the valid range of the parameter by si = 0.1 step width. After finding the best parameter
value, bi , at the first search iteration, we adjust the step width, si+1, by si×0.1 (e.g., 0.01
at the second iteration) and adjust the search range for the parameter to [bi − si,bi + si]
for the next iteration. We continue the iterations until the difference between the best
accuracy values found at the ith and i−1th iterations are less than 0.01. Note that our
HPO searches all the possible values in the valid ranges of the integer- and enum-type
parameters at the first iteration, and then uses the best-found values at the subsequent
iterations for tuning real-type parameters.








repeat for all ISO controls
leave one
project out
repeat for all projects
one project for test
Fig. 4 Leave-one-out validation for all projects.
Following HPO, wemeasure through cross validation the accuracy of the alternative
ML algorithms for predicting ISO controls. The cross validation process is illustrated
in Figure 3. The “repeat 10 times” block in the figure applies standard 10-fold cross
validation (Bishop 2007) to the classifier built for an individual ISO control. This
is done by selecting one control and splitting all related projects into 10 folds, then
training the classifier for that particular control on 9 folds of the project dataset, and
testing it on the remaining one. This is repeated for all the ISO controls through the
“repeat for all ISO controls” block. At the end, the “compute metrics” step calculates
the EXPI accuracy metrics described in Section 5.5.
EXPII. This experiment answers RQ2. We evaluate the importance of the features in
Table 2 based on the best-found configuration in RQ1. For each of the ISO-control
classifiers, we rank the features using a standard metric for feature evaluation, as we
discuss in Section 5.5. We then identify and aggregate the most influential features
across all the ISO controls. The most influential features are aggregated by considering
the five most important features being used, based on the rankings obtained for the
prediction of each of the considered controls.
EXPIII. This experiment answers RQ3 by examining how much useful assistance one
can expect from ML for identifying the ISO controls relevant to a given assessment
project. Specifically, EXPIII performs the leave-one-out validation process shown in
Figure 4. Leaving one project out in EXPIII aligns well with how computer-supported
security risk assessment would be done in practice. A security expert would typically
identify relevant security controls for one project at a time. It is therefore natural to
try to take advantage of all the available information (other than the project under
assessment) for decision support. The “leave one project out” step takes one project
out from the dataset. The remaining dataset is then utilized for training the classifiers
of all the ISO controls. Subsequently, the withheld project is used for testing the
trained classifiers, as shown in “repeat for all ISO controls” block of the figure. This is
repeated for all the projects in the dataset, as indicated by the “repeat for all projects”
block. At the end of the process, we compute the EXPIII accuracy metrics described
in Section 5.5.
EIS. This expert interview survey addresses RQ4. We conducted an interview survey
with risk assessors from the banking domain in order to assess the practitioners’
perceptions about the usefulness of interpretable ML in the context of security-control
identification. The detailed procedure for our survey is described in Section 5.6.
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5.5 Metrics
In EXPI, for a given ISO control c, we define the precision and recall metrics as
follows: (1) precision Pc = TP/(TP+FP) and (2) recall Rc = TP/(TP+FN), where
TP, FP, and FN are the sum of the true positives, false positives, and false negatives,
respectively, across the 10 folds of cross validation for ISO control c. A true positive is
a project to which c is relevant and is correctly predicted as such; a false positive is a
project to which c is not relevant but is incorrectly predicted to have c as a control; a
false negative is a project to which c is relevant but is incorrectly predicted to not have
c as a control. These metrics are used for comparing the accuracy of different ML
algorithms by using the average precision and recall across the considered controls.
In practice, the decision as to whether an ISO control is applicable should be made
as simple as possible to minimize the effort needed from the analysts. The most critical
factor here is recall, since the presence of false negatives implies that important ISO
controls may be missed. A recall that is too low would thus undermine the usefulness
of the approach, meaning that the analysts would be better off doing the selection
of the relevant controls entirely manually. To allow the analysts to focus only on the
recommended controls, we prioritize recall over precision.
In EXPII, we use the standard gain ratio metric (Quinlan 1986). This metric, which
is commonly used for ranking ML features, is a modification of the information gain
metric aiming to reduce bias on multi-valued features. EXPII uses the gain ratio to
measure the overall importance of the features across all the classifiers.
In EXPIII, we define precision and recall around a project. This is in contrast to
EXPI, where these notions were defined around an ISO control. Let p be the project
withheld from the set of all projects in a given round of leave-one-out validation. We
define (1) precision Pp as TP/(TP+FP) and (2) recall Rp as TP/(TP+FN), where
TP is the number of relevant ISO controls correctly predicted as such for project p,
FP is the number of ISO controls that are not relevant to project p but are incorrectly
predicted as being relevant, and FN is the number of relevant ISO controls incorrectly
predicted as not being relevant to project p. These precision and recall metrics are
used for measuring overall accuracy at a project level.
5.6 Expert Interview Survey
After developing our ML-based approach for security-control identification, we
organized a series of interviews to collect feedback from the team of risk assessors
at our collaborating partner. To this end, we held a separate interview with each of
the six members of this team. They had at least three years of experience conducting
security risk assessments, with more than 50 years of collective experience on the
subject among the members. All interviewees possessed in-depth knowledge of the
ISO 27001 and 27002 standards.
To conduct the interviews, we randomly selected seven ISO controls from the
total of 83 covered in our ML experimentation. We then took the classification model
generated for each of these seven controls by the best-performing ML configuration,
i.e., J48 with CSL and the optimal hyper-parameter values as described in Section 6.1.
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Statement 1. The presented decision tree is easy to understand.
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree
Statement 2. The decision tree helps me identify the main factors in deciding whether ISO X should apply.
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree  I Don’t Know
Statement 3. The presented decision tree is consistent with how I decide about the applicability of ISO X.
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree  I Don’t Know
Overall Statement. Decision trees help provide a documented method for choosing the applicable security
controls.
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly Disagree  I Don’t Know
Fig. 5 Statements for assessing the usefulness of interpretable ML classification models for security-control
identification. Statements 1, 2, 3 are asked per classification model per expert; the Overall Statement is
asked only once from each expert at the end of the interview survey.
The models yielded by J48 are decision trees. We created a visual representation of
these trees, shown in Figure 6, and used the visual representation as the basis for
the interviews. Due to the limited availability of security experts for the interviews,
assessing more than seven models (described above) or reviewing all of the generated
models with each risk assessor would have been infeasible.
Each decision tree in Figure 6 is targeted at a specific ISO control. For example,
ISO 11.5.1 is a security control that concerns secure log-on procedures for systems and
applications. The respective decision tree for identifying ISO 11.5.1 is shown at the
top of the figure. The decision tree contains seven decision factors regarding threats,
vulnerabilities, and assets captured in the nodes of the tree, and decision conditions
captured as edge predicates. The interpretation of a decision tree starts from the root
decision factor, and then descends (deterministically) to the appropriate child node
based on the evaluation of the associated edge predicates. Each leaf node represents a
yes/no answer as to whether a specific ISO control should apply.
In our interview survey, each participant was asked to evaluate, one by one, the
trees in Figure 6 and then rate, for each tree, Statements 1, 2, and 3 shown in Figure 5.
Once a participant had evaluated all the seven trees, (s)he was asked to rate the Overall
Statement in Figure 5. To mitigate confounding effects such as fatigue, the order in
which to examine the trees was chosen randomly for each participant.
The statements in Figure 5 were designed by taking inspiration from Rogers’ theory
of innovation diffusion (Rogers 2003). This theory introduces five characteristics that
influence the adoption of innovative solutions. These characteristics, all of which are
based on practitioners’ perceptions, are:
– Complexity, referring to the degree to which an innovation is perceived to be difficult
to understand or use.
– Compatibility, referring to the degree to which an innovation is perceived as
consistent with existing values, experiences, and needs of practitioners.
– Trialability, referring to the degree to which an innovation can be tried on a limited
basis or adopted in increments.
– Observability, referring to the degree to which the results of an innovation are
visible to others.
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Does the following vulnerability apply?
“No controls are in place for
potential information leakage”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Confidential information is not adequately
protected against disclosure”
Does the project contain any middleware?
What is the traceability score?
ISO 12.5.4 













shall not apply ✘
ISO 12.5.4 Does the following vulnerability apply?
“No back-up was in scope for
this asset, application or service”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Restore is not working because neither
the backups were verified for completion









shall not apply ✘
ISO 10.5.1 
shall apply ✔
Risk of “Penalties due to conflict with 3rd party”
>6<=6
ISO 10.5.1
Does the following threat apply?
“Unauthorized disclosure of
confidential business unit information”
Does the following vulnerability apply?









shall not apply ✘
ISO 11.6.1 
shall apply ✔
Risk of “Unauthorized changes of
one of the assets/applications/functionalities
in production”
>4<=4
ISO 11.6.1 Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Oversight when defining access control rules
to shared information”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Business unit employees have too many












shall not apply ✘








What is the overall confidentiality impact
of the involved threats?
Does the following vulnerability apply?









shall not apply ✘
Does the following threat apply?




What is the risk level associated with the threat:
“Abuse or manipulation of
assets or data by 3rd party”?






shall not apply ✘
ISO 10.4.2 
shall not apply ✘
ISO 10.4.2 ISO 10.6.2
What is the confidentiality impact of the threats?
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“No or poorly defined records protection requirements”
How many critical assets does the project have?
Does the following threat apply?
“Abuse or manipulation of the asset/application by employees”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Disciplinary measures are not dissuasive enough”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“Access rights not disabled or removed 
for users who have changed roles”
Does the following vulnerability apply?
“No logging or monitoring of activities”
ISO 11.5.1 










shall not apply ✘
ISO 11.5.1 









Fig. 6 The decision trees (produced by J48) used for answering RQ4. One node is blurred out of each tree
for confidentiality.
Using Machine Learning to Assist with the Selection of Security Controls 21
– Relative advantage, referring to the degree to which an innovation is perceived to
be better than what is currently used.
Among these five characteristics, we focus on the first three, namely, complexity,
compatibility, and trialability; we cannot tackle the last two characteristics yet since
our approach has not yet been deployed in practice. Statement 1 in Figure 5 concerns
complexity. In particular, this statement assesses the degree to which a generated
classification model is understandable. Statements 2 and 3 concern compatibility.
In particular, they assess the degree to which a generated classification model is
aligned with the cognitive processes that risk assessors follow for security-control
identification. Finally, the Overall Statement concerns trialability. In particular, the
statement examines how helpful the generated models are as an instrument for codifying
reusable knowledge about security controls.
The risk assessors participating in our interview survey used a five-point Likert
scale (Likert 1932) for expressing their opinions about the statements in Figure 5.
The possible options were: “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neutral”, “Disagree”, and
“Strongly Disagree”. Besides, the risk assessors were allowed to choose “I Don’t Know”
for all but Statement 1, as shown in Figure 5. Providing an option to opt out of rating a
statement was meant at ensuring that the participants would choose the most accurate
option rather than being forced to choose an option even when they could not form an
opinion (Kitchenham and Pfleeger 2002).
All six interviews were conducted by the first author. To avoid fatigue, the maximum
duration of an interview was limited to two hours. When an interview could not be
finishedwithin a two-hour slot, it was stopped and continued the next day the interviewee
was available. In each interview, we first introduced the statements in Figure 5. To
ensure that the risk assessors had understood the statements correctly and to properly
collect the rationale behind their answers, we asked the assessors to verbalize their
reasoning. We were expressly forbidden from (voice) recording the interviews due to
concerns about security and confidentiality, but we were allowed to take notes.
6 Results
In this section, we answer the RQs of Section 5.1 based on the results of our case study.
6.1 RQ1
Table 3 shows the results of EXPI, described in Section 5.4. Specifically, the table
reports the average precision and recall – average Pc and Rc , defined in Section 5.5,
across all ISO controls – of the six alternative ML classification algorithms considered.
As we argued previously, in our application context, recall has priority over
precision. The results of Table 3 thus clearly suggest that J48, which yields an average
recall of 94.51% and average precision of 60.42%, is the best choice among the ML
classification algorithm considered. When J48 is applied alongside CSL with a cost
ratio of 14 to 1 for false negatives versus false positives (see Section 5.4), the optimal
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hyper-parameters are as follows: pruning confidence=0.02 and minimal number of
instances per leaf=9.
Table 3 Comparison of the average precision and recall of different ML classification algorithms with
optimized hyper-parameters.
Algorithm CSL SMOTE SMOTE+ENN
Pc(avg.) Rc(avg.) Pc(avg.) Rc(avg.) Pc(avg.) Rc(avg.)
J48 60.42 94.51 81.86 76.67 77.22 68.29
CART 46.72 89.13 80.56 61.35 79.78 61.01
JRip 64.33 89.93 73.22 83.17 72.49 80.03
PART 66.79 91.31 77.31 74.69 68.63 73.14
Logistic regression 61.62 43.28 62.15 63.57 69.69 57.72
Naive Bayes 34.89 56.91 18.62 61.93 16.93 66.07
The answer to RQ1 is that J48 combined with CSL leads to the most accurate
classification. Using this combination, we obtained an average recall of 94.51% and
average precision of 60.42% in our case study.
We answer RQ2 and RQ3 using J48, CSL, and the best hyper-parameter values
mentioned above.
6.2 RQ2
As explained in EXPII of Section 5.4, we use gain ratio for estimating the importance
of our features (Table 2). Based on the gain-ratio scores of the features across all the
ISO-control classifiers, we make the following observations:
1. There are 12 vulnerabilities that have a zero gain ratio in all the classifiers. A
subsequent investigation revealed that the vulnerabilities in question are not present
in any of the past projects. We excluded these vulnerabilities from the dataset. The
impact of this exclusion on precision and recall is negligible.
2. With the above 12 vulnerabilities removed, we observed that different ISO-control
classifiers use different but overlapping subsets of features. This indicates that the
decision about the relevance of different ISO controls is influenced by different
factors. The feature subsets were picked automatically by J48’s internal feature
selection mechanism as implemented in Weka (this mechanism is also based on
gain ratio).
In light of the second observation above, we answer RQ2 by measuring the overall
importance of the features across all the classifiers. To do so, we first aggregated the
top five most important features based on the rankings obtained from the different
classifiers. We then computed the importance of a set F of features of the same type
(e.g., vulnerability features: V1 to V154 in Table 2) as the percentage of the number of
classifiers having some feature of F in their top five most important features. Table 4
shows the results. For example, most (≈ 99%) of the classifiers have some vulnerability
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Fig. 7 Precision and recall distributions resulting from leave-one-out validation.
in their top five most important features. The domain experts in our study stated that
the results of Table 4 were consistent with their intuition about the most important
factors in determining the relevance of ISO controls.
Table 4 Most important features for ISO-control classification.







98.79% 57.83% 40.97% 13.49% 12.05% 2.41% 1.19%
The answer toRQ2 is that overall and in descending order of magnitude, vulnerabili-
ties, risks, threats, threat impact, the number of assets per category, security answers,
and the number of assets are the most influential feature groups. This finding is
consistent with the intuition of the security specialists in our case study.
6.3 RQ3
Figure 7 summarizes through a boxplot the results of EXPIII, described in Section 5.4.
Specifically, the boxplot shows the distributions of precision, Pp, and recall, Rp,
as defined in Section 5.5. On average, our approach has a recall of 93.52% and
precision of 63.12% when tasked with identifying the ISO controls relevant to a given
project. The high recall suggests that the analysts can focus most of their attention
on the recommended ISO controls, since the recommendations most likely contain
all the relevant controls. The precision is reasonable too: On average, our approach
recommends 8.9 ISO controls – both true and false positives – for a project. Of these, one
can expect an average of 5.6 recommendations to be correct and 3.3 to be incorrect. The
domain experts in our study confirmed that, given the small number of recommended
ISO controls, they can vet the validity of the recommendations efficiently.
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Fig. 8 Recall values for the ISO control classifiers; datapoints highlighted with  are the culprits behind the
low-recall projects (where Rp < 75%).
From Figure 7, we further observe that the recall (Rp) for 17 out of the total of 255
projects in our dataset is below 75%. Upon a follow-up investigation, we determined
that the root cause for low recall in these projects is that the majority of the ISO controls
relevant to these projects have low prevalence in the dataset. In Figure 8, we plot the
recall of each ISO-control classifier (Rc) against the prevalence of the respective ISO
control in the dataset. The 11 datapoints encircled by  represent the ISO controls that
bring about low recall in the above-mentioned 17 projects. A complementary insight
from Figure 8 is that recall is highly stable for those ISO controls that occur at least 15
times in our dataset. As noted previously, handling less frequent ISO controls requires
complementary techniques and is the subject of future work.
With regard to execution time, we make the following remarks: Generating J48
classification models for all the ISO controls subject to our experiments took 242
seconds in total; this gives an average training time of 2.92 seconds per ISO control.
With the classifiers built, issuing recommendations for a given project takes an average
of 1.95 seconds. These results suggest that our approach is scalable.
The answer to RQ3 is that, based on our case study results, our approach shows
promise in terms of usefulness. In particular, our approach has a high recall (93.52%)
and acceptable precision (63.12%) in identifying the ISO controls relevant to a
security assessment project. Further, the execution times for training and classification
are small. This suggests that our approach will scale to larger datasets.
6.4 RQ4
Figure 9 shows the results for the individual decision trees considered in our interview
survey as well as the overall feedback. These results were obtained by following the
procedure described in Section 5.6. Every set of three adjacent bars represents the
ratings collected for Statements 1, 2, and 3 (Figure 5) over one tree. The rightmost
barchart in Figure 9 reports the results for the Overall Statement (Figure 5).
To facilitate our discussion of the results, we combine the participants’ responses
across the seven decision trees for each statement of Figure 5. The combined results –
captured as a heatmap (Grinstein et al. 2001) – are depicted in Figure 10. Each value
on this heatmap corresponds to the frequency of a certain rating for a given statement.
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Statement Statement Statement Statement Statement Statement Statement
ISO 10.4.2 ISO 10.5.1 ISO 10.6.2 ISO 11.1.1 ISO 11.5.1 ISO 11.6.1 ISO 12.5.4

























Opinion Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree I Don’t Know
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Fig. 9 Barchart representation of the interview survey results for the decision trees of Figure 6; the rightmost

























Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3








0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fig. 10 Heatmap representation of the interview survey results.
We recall that, in total, we had six participants and seven decision trees. Hence, the
heatmap has 42 datapoints (Likert-scale ratings) for each of the Statements 1, 2, and 3,
and six datapoints for the Overall Statement. We further note that the “I Don’t Know”
response does not apply to Statement 1 as marked on the heatmap.
We observe from the results of Statement 1 that all participants felt they were
able to understand the presented decision trees and expressed positive feedback, i.e.,
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”.
With regard to Statement 2, in 83.33% (35/42) of the cases, the participants
strongly agreed or agreed that the trees were helpful for identifying the main factors
for deciding whether or not a security control should apply. In 7.14% (3/42) of the
cases, the participants were neutral; and in the remaining 7.14% (3/42) of the cases,
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Table 5 Reasons why the participants answered with non-positive ratings (“Neutral”, “Disagree”, or




An important factor does not appear in the decision tree. 5
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Some factor that appears in the decision tree is not used by





A numeric threshold in an edge condition, e.g., 2 in “<= 2”,




The expert was unable to reconcile the decision tree with




The security control in question is vague to the expert, as
a result of which the expert is unable to commit to a clear
decision process.
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they disagreed. With regard to Statement 3, the participants strongly agreed or agreed
in 57.14% (24/42) of the cases that the decision trees were aligned with how they
decided about the applicability of the security control in question. In 26.19% (11/42),
the participants were neutral; and in the remaining 14.28% (6/42) of the cases, the
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed.
An unsurprising but important conclusion from our results for Statements 2 and 3
– considering that both statements target the technical dimension of decision making
about security controls – is that, like in most decision-making tasks, the experts
exercise a certain degree of subjectivity. This is evidenced by the mix of positive
(“Strongly Agree” and “Agree”) and non-positive (“Neutral”, “Disagree”, or “Strongly
Disagree”) ratings for these two statements, as shown in Figure 9. Overall, the results
for Statements 2 and 3 are tilted to the positive side. Particularly, from Figure 10, we
observe that out of the total of 84 ratings for Statements 2 and 3, only 23 (27.38%) are
non-positive. We compute the average of the participants’ responses by quantifying
the agreement scale from 0 for “Strongly Disagree” to 4 for “Strongly Agree” and
excluding the “I Don’t Know” responses. This gives us, on average, 2.90 (between
“Neutral” and “Agree”) for Statement 2 and 2.46 (between “Neutral” and “Agree”) for
Statement 3.
Using the rationale and qualitative feedback that the participants provided through-
out the interviews, we examined all the 23 non-positive ratings for Statements 2 and 3
in order to identify the issue(s) that prompted these ratings. We distinguish five reasons
for the non-positive ratings. These reasons are shown in Table 5 alongside the number
of ratings (out of 23) falling under each.
The Missing factor category explains five of the non-positive ratings; in two cases
the participants indicated that the missing factor is tacit, i.e., not captured explicitly
and known only from (verbal) interaction with clients. In the three remaining cases, the
participants believed that the missing factor would be extractable from the unstructured
text, e.g., project and asset descriptions, that is stored in the database.
The Orthogonal factor category explains eight non-positive ratings. In four cases,
the participants felt that the non-relevant factor should be replaced with a factor that is
present in the assessment database; in one case, the replacement was deemed absent
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from the assessment database but retrievable from a different source (database). As for
the remaining three cases, the participants only noted the non-relevance of a factor but
did not suggest a clear resolution (e.g., discarding the factor altogether or replacing it).
The Numeric threshold mismatch category explains five non-positive ratings. In
all cases, the participants preferred a different value for some edge predicate in the
decision tree. The Conceptual mismatch category explains three non-positive ratings;
in all cases the participants felt that the decision process they had internalized could
not be expressed with a decision tree. The Vague control category explains two ratings;
in both cases the participants felt the security control in question had not been defined
clearly enough. Since the definition of the security controls is outside our control, it
is sensible to treat the two ratings under Vague control as "I Don’t Know" answers.
Nevertheless, no suggestion to this effect was made to the participants in order to avoid
interference with the ratings.
In terms of opportunities for improvement, the main finding from our analysis of
non-positive ratings is that the unstructured textual data in the assessment database
may hold cues for building better classification models. Similarly, the situations
where decision trees turned out not to match the experts’ way of thinking deserve
additional investigation. Pursuing these directions is left for future work. Also, given
the subjectivity seen in the expert responses, it would be worthwhile to develop a
structured negotiation process for resolving disagreements about the pertinence of
security controls. Having such a process should help reduce inconsistencies and get
better, consistent decision procedures. Decision trees can be a useful vehicle for
this purpose by making inconsistencies explicit and helping establish a common
understanding and practice.
Finally, as seen from Figures 9 and 10, the responses to the Overall Statement
(Figure 5) were unanimously positive, indicating that the participants saw benefit
in decision trees as an instrument for documenting the decision-making process for
security controls. Two interesting remarks made to this end by the participants are as
follows: “The [decision tree] models could help standardize the selection of security
controls” and “Such trees could provide a sneak peek to business owners to explain the
logic behind why a control is being applied.”We observe that the unanimously positive
results for the Overall Statement are in spite of Statements 2 and 3 having received
some non-positive responses. We discussed this discrepancy with the participants; they
confirmed their ratings of the Overall Statement, arguing that, despite the occasional
inaccuracies they saw in the trees, for a majority of the controls, they found the trees to
be useful and consistent with their expertise.
The answer to RQ4 is that the security risk assessors participating in our interview
survey had a generally positive perception of decision trees as a tool for making
explicit the logic behind security-control identification.
7 Threats to Validity
The validity considerations most relevant to our work are construct, conclusion, and
external validity, as we discuss below.
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Construct validity: To mitigate construct validity threats posed by ill-defined metrics,
we use standard and commonly used metrics to answer our RQs. For RQ1 and RQ3,
we use the standard precision and recall metrics. To answer RQ2, we use the standard
gain ratio metric. To answer RQ4, we use a five-point Likert scale. Our evaluation
metrics are scoped to the security controls for which there are at least five occurrences
in the historical data. Below this threshold, applying ML is unlikely to be meaningful.
Our evaluation examines whether ML is a suitable technique for our analytical purpose
only when ML is applicable. Other techniques – not explored in this article – are
required for dealing with the security controls to which ML cannot be meaningfully
applied.
Conclusion validity: Our quantitative evaluations (RQ1 and RQ3) are based on
precision and recall, which are standard classification accuracy metrics. These metrics
are only indicative of in-vivo usefulness. To mitigate this threat to conclusion validity
and better examine whether our approach has the potential of being useful in practice,
we performed a complementary qualitative study in the form of an interview survey
(RQ4). This survey directly assesses the perceptions of practicing engineers about
our approach. The quality of the decision trees in our survey study highly depends
on the quality of the training data, which, in our work, is the past ten years of actual
risk assessments performed by our collaborating industry partner. The security-critical
nature of the application domain (i.e., banking) where our training data has been
curated from and the level of scrutiny that has gone into this data by numerous expert
assessors over the years provides a certain degree of confidence about the quality of the
data. This said, there is no guarantee that all the decisions in the data are correct, and it
is likely that some mistakes may have occurred. It is therefore important to not view the
derived decision trees as perfect decision-making tools, but rather as means to make
explicit the logic that has been applied in the past. Ultimately, the derived decision
trees should be treated as mechanisms for assistance, rather than full automation. In
other words, the final decision as to whether the logic represented in a decision tree is
correct in the context of a specific project always has to be left to a human expert.
External validity: Generalizability is an important concern for any single case study,
including the one in this article. While the historical information we draw on for
learning is aligned with commonly used ISO standards and is thus representative of a
broader set of security assessment practices in industry, additional case studies are
essential for examining whether our approach remains effective in other application
contexts. In particular, the nature and source of security controls in other contexts and
how accurately the pertinence of these controls can be determined through automation
requires further investigation. The same argument holds for the interview survey we
conducted to examine the benefits of our approach. The current survey reports on the
reflections of a group of experts working at the same institution. Surveys with a broader
scope and pool of respondents remain necessary for obtaining a more conclusive
picture of the practical usefulness of our approach.
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8 Conclusion
In this article, we proposed an approach based on machine learning for assisting
analysts with the task of deciding what security controls are relevant to a given system
and context. This task is an important prerequisite for the proper elaboration of security
requirements in the early stages of development. We evaluated our approach using
real security assessment data from the banking domain. The results suggest that our
approach provides effective decision support for security controls whose application is
not too rare in the existing data. For these controls, our approach yielded an average
recall of ≈ 94% and average precision of ≈ 63%. We further examined through a survey
the opinions of six domain experts about the usefulness of our approach in practice.
The survey results suggest that the classification models derived from historical data
are largely in line with how experts reason about the applicability of security controls.
In the future, we would like to study whether complementary techniques such
as case-based reasoning can be utilized for handling security controls with too few
occurrences in the existing data. Another important future direction is to provide
automated decision support for the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, action plans
and residual risks. Although security controls (respectively, threats, vulnerabilities,
action plans and residual risks) are applied independently from one another in practice,
tacit associations may still exist among them. We further plan to mine such associations
and utilize the results in order to improve the accuracy of our decision support.
Broadening our approach to cover these aspects requires going beyond the structured
assessment information that is stored according to a pre-defined schema. In particular,
we will need to additionally consider and extract security-related information from
textual development artifacts, e.g., system and asset descriptions. Finally, we would like
to perform new case studies to investigate the usefulness of our approach in domains
other than banking.
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